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MCCULLOUGH V. GOODRICH & PENNINGTONMORTGAGE FUND,INC.:
ARE SECURED CREDITORS REALLY "SECURE" FROM THIRD PARTY
IMPAIRMENT OF COLLATERAL?

1.

INTRODUCTION

In any secured transaction, the lender and the debtor typically agree on the type
of collateral that will be subject to the lender's security interest.' Both parties have
made a conscious decision to determine what particular property belonging to the
debtor will be used to secure the loan.2 When the two parties contemplate securing
a loan with collateral, "the real subject matter of the secured transaction is the
economic value ofthe collateral." 3 Additionally, inherent in any security agreement
is the emergence of a "bundle of rights" associated with the collateral that is
intimately tied to the economic value of the collateral.4 As a general proposition,
commercial law should respect secured parties' bundle of rights by attempting to
ensure that the collateral maintains its economic value and by "protect[ing] secured
parties against actions and events that effectively reduce the collateral's economic
value."' But how far should courts go in affording protection to a secured party
when the value ofthe collateral has been impaired? More specifically, should courts
allow a secured party to maintain a cause of action for negligence against a third
party for causing a reduction in the value of the collateral?
Recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed this precise question
by accepting the following certified question from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina: "Does South Carolina law recognize a secured
creditor's right to bring a claim for negligent/wrongful impairment of collateral
where a third party's negligence or other actions caused the erosion, destruction, or
reduction in value of the secured party's collateral?" 6 For the court, the answer
depended on whether there is any basis in South Carolina law recognizing an
independent legal duty owed by a third party to a secured creditor such that a
secured creditor may maintain an independent tort claim against the third party
Concluding that there is no contractual relationship,8 property interest in intangible
collateral, 9 special circumstance, 10 or statutory scheme" that provides a basis for

1. See Lars S. Smith, General Intangible or Commercial Tort: Moral Rights and State-Based
Intellectual Property as Collateral Under U. CC. Revised Article 9, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 95, 99

(2005).
2. See id.
3. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Rethinking Proceeds. The History, MisinterpretationandRevision of
U. C.C. Section 9-306, 69 TUL. L. REv. 645, 694 (1995).
4. See Harold R. Weinberg, SecuredParty's Right to Sue ThirdPersonsforDamage to orDefects
in Collateral,81 COM. L.J. 445, 448 (1976).
5. Freyermuth, supra note 3, at 694.
6. McCullough v. Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc., 373 S.C. 43, 47, 644 S.E.2d 43,
45-46 (2007).
7. See id. at 47, 644 S.E.2d at 46.
8. Id. at 50, 644 S.E.2d at 47.
9. Id. at 52, 644 S.E.2d at 48.
10. Id. at 53, 644 S.E.2d at 49.
11. Id. at 55, 644 S.E.2d at 50.
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recognizing a legal duty between a secured creditor and a third party, the court held
"that South Carolina law does not recognize a secured creditor's independent claim
against a third party for negligent impairment of collateral.' 2
As this Note argues, the court should have held that a security interest in any
form of collateral is a sufficient property interest to form the basis for recognizing
a secured party's right to bring an independent tort claim against a third party for
impairing the value of the collateral. The security interest at issue in McCullough
was the right to receive payments under a contract between the debtor and a third
party. 3 The court distinguished between tangible personal property and intangible
collateral, concluding that while a property interest in tangible personal property
could provide a basis for a secured creditor's claim against a third party, a secured
creditor's interest in intangible collateral, such as the "contractual right to receive
payments,"' 4 does not provide the same basis for such a claim. 15 As this Note
discusses, the court's distinction is unwarranted. Because there is a bundle of rights
associated with any security interest in collateral, 6 the law should fully protect a
security interest in collateral. Thus, a security interest in any form of collateral
should provide a basis for recognizing a secured party's right to maintain a tort
claim against a third party for impairing the collateral's value.
Although at first glance McCullough may appear to leave a secured creditor
without relief against third party impairment of collateral, this is not necessarily the
case. This Note articulates two options courts may choose from to protect a secured
party against third party impairment of collateral. Under South Carolina's revised
version of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Article 9), upon default by
the debtor, the secured creditor, by exercising the debtor's rights against the third
party, may maintain an action against a third party that impairs the value of the
collateral. 7 Additionally, a secured party may be able to protect itself before the
debtor defaults by obtaining an assignment of the debtor's accrued cause of action
against the third party.' 8 However, under either option, a secured creditor may only
assert the debtor's rights in bringing a claim against a third party as, after
McCullough, the secured party has no independent rights against the third party. 9
Nonetheless, secured creditors will often be able to protect themselves, at least to
some extent, from third parties impairing the value of collateral.
Part I1 of this Note begins with a brief explanation of the various reasons
parties choose to enter into secured transactions, reviewing the benefits to both the
secured lender and the debtor of securing loans with collateral. Part 11 next provides
the facts and procedural history that led the district court to certify the question at
issue to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Finally, Part 11 concludes with a brief
description of the court's holding and articulated reasoning. Part ITT of this Note
argues that a security interest in any form of collateral is a sufficient property
interest to warrant recognition of a secured party's right to maintain a tort claim

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 46, 644 S.E.2d at 45.
Id.
Id. at 52, 644 S.E.2d at 48.
See Weinberg, supra note 4.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-607(a)(3) cmt. 3 (2003).
See infra text accompanying notes 164-66.
McCullough, 373 S.C. at 55, 644 S.E.2d at 50.
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against a third party for impairing the collateral. Part ITT then presents alternatives
that may offer protection to secured parties when a third party impairs their
collateral, notwithstanding the McCullough court's refusal to permit a secured
creditor to bring its own independent claim against the third party. Finally, Part IV
concludes by suggesting that the McCullough court's recognition of such a claim
would have created greater certainty for secured creditors by ensuring adequate
protection of their rights in the collateral. However, because secured creditors are
now less certain that courts will protect their interests from events that impair the
value of their collateral, they may be forced to raise their interest rates, ultimately
adversely impacting consumers.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Why PartiesEnter into Secured Transactions

The practice of securing loans with some form of collateral is a prominent
feature in the domestic economy.2" But why exactly do parties use secured forms
of credit? A full understanding of the reasons why parties enter into secured
transactions reveals why the economic value of the security interest is of primary
importance in any secured transaction.
Generally, the primary purpose of securing loans with collateral is "to assure
repayment of the debt in case of default."'" Thus, the most obvious advantage to the
lender for issuing secured credit is the lender's direct legal right to take and
liquidate the collateral used to secure the loan in order to collect on the borrower's
outstanding debt.22 Thus, a secured creditor's legal right to take the collateral
enhances the ability to ensure repayment. Three important features of the law of
secured credit23 increase the lender's leverage in such situations.24 First, securing
credit with collateral gives priority to the lender so that the lender is paid before
other creditors.25 Second, securing credit with collateral results in an encumbrance
on the collateral, giving the lender a permanent interest in a particular asset.26
Finally, such an arrangement enhances the lender's ability to force repayment more
quickly than when the debt is unsecured.2 Because of this enhanced ability to
enforce repayment of the secured loan, the lender is more confident that he will
recover the debt owed than when the transaction is unsecured. Thus, a secured
creditor is relieved of most of the financial risk if the debtor defaults on the loan.
Because "the real subject matter of [a] secured transaction is the economic value

20. Ronald J. Mann, Explainingthe PatternofSecured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625,627 (1997)
(stating that during the mid-1990s domestic lenders held approximately $2 trillion in secured debt).
21. MBank Grand Prairie v. State, 737 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. C. App. 1987).
22. See Mann, supra note 20, at 639 (citing Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy
Priorities:A Review of Current Theories,10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (1981)). However, as Professor Mann
appropriately points out, lenders must face the risk that liquidation of the collateral may not always
result in full repayment of the principal and interest. Id. at 640 n.55.
23. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain,80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1921 (1994)
("Security offers the user some combination of three features,... priority, encumbrance, and remedy.").
24. Mann, supra note 20, at 639 (citing LoPucki, supra note 23, at 1921 23).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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of the collateral,"" a secured creditor's relief from the risk of the borrower's default
only exists to the extent that the collateral maintains its value.
Additionally, there are less direct and more subtle advantages for the lender
with a loan secured by collateral.2 9 These advantages "have significance" before the
lender ever attempts to enforce repayment by exercising its legal right to take the
collateral.3 ° Specifically, because of the lender's pending legal right to take the
collateral in the event of default, the borrower has an increased incentive to
voluntarily repay the loan." Thus, this indirect advantage to the lender stems from
the lender's aforementioned direct advantage of the ability to collect the collateral
to force repayment.32 Increasing the incentive of a borrower to voluntarily repay the
loan is a considerable advantage to the secured lender, as "[t]he borrower's
voluntary decision to repay the loan protects the lender from the vagaries of the
liquidation process[] and saves the lender the time and hassle ... of pursuing the
borrower and the collateral."'"
Furthermore, extending secured credit can reduce the lender's cost of
monitoring the borrower for risky behavior that could significantly increase the
possibility that the lender will not receive full repayment of the loan.34 By securing
a loan with collateral, the lender is able to "focus his attention on the continued
availability of [the] collateral" and the maintenance of its value;35 therefore, the
lender is "free to disregard" activities of the debtor unassociated with the
collateral. 6 As a result, the monitoring required to prevent the debtor from
engaging in conduct that would increase the likelihood of nonpayment is likely to
be considerably less for a secured lender than an unsecured lender,3 who typically
must monitor the debtor's activities with regard to the debtor's entire estate. By
focusing his attention on the collateral itself, "the secured creditor can reduce the
number and complexity of his monitoring tasks and thus achieve a substantial
savings in monitoring costs." 8
Moreover, the advantages of secured credit transactions are not solely limited
to the lender. Because securing a loan with collateral lowers the risk of
nonpayment, the lender is able to offer a loan at a lower interest rate or on more
consumer-friendly terms than the lender would otherwise be able to offer in an
unsecured transaction. 9Additionally, conventional wisdom suggests that due to the
availability of secured credit, lenders extend credit to high risk debtors in situations

28. Freyermuth, supra note 3.
29. See Mann, supra note 20, at 638-39.
30. Id.at640.
31. Id. at 645 n.72 (explaining that borrowers "react[] to the 'shadow' of the law" by anticipating
what would happen if the lender exercised its legal right).
32. Id.
33. Id.at647.
34. Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financingand PrioritiesAmong
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1152 53 (1979) ("[T]he existence of collateral is also likely to reduce the
cost of the monitoring required to guard against the debtor covertly increasing the riskiness of the
loan.").
35. Id. at 1153.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Mann, supra note 20, at 667.
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where they would hesitate to extend unsecured credit. 40 Thus, debtors will often
offer a lender some form of collateral in order to secure a loan.
Because the value of the collateral assures loan repayment to the lender upon
default and allows the debtor to receive a lower interest rate, parties to security
agreements are likely to concern themselves with the economic value of the
collateral. Therefore, providing certainty that the collateral will maintain its value
serves to protect the parties' bargained-for security arrangement. But how far
should courts go to ensure that the collateral maintains its economic value? Should
a secured party have the right to bring an independent tort claim against a third
party that has impaired the value of the collateral? In McCullough, the South
Carolina Supreme Court confronted this precise issue.
B. McCullough v. Goodrich & Pennington Mortgage Fund, Inc.
1. Facts and ProceduralHistory
In 1997, Goodrich & Pennington Mortgage Fund, Inc. (G&P), a mortgage
lender, entered into a contractual agreement with Advanta Mortgage Corporation
(Advanta) whereby Advanta agreed to "service" certain mortgages originated by
G&P.4 ' Essentially, Advanta was required to collect money due on the G&P
mortgages and to take "appropriate action when a borrower" defaulted on an
obligation to pay.42 Under the terms of its agreement, Advanta was to make
payments to G&P relating to the servicing of the mortgage loans.43
In 1999, HomeGold Financial, Inc. (HomeGold) loaned approximately $1
million to G&P.44 As collateral for these loans, HomeGold took a security interest
in the contractual rights of G&P to receive payment from Advanta.45 G&P notified
Advanta of the security agreement that it had with HomeGold.46 In 2001, Advanta
named Chase Home Finance, LLC (Chase) its attorney-in-fact for servicing the
mortgages originated by G&P.47
Ultimately, G&P defaulted on its loan from HomeGold in 2005.48 Meanwhile,
HomeGold had filed for protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.49
Ralph McCullough was appointed as plan trustee for HomeGold's bankruptcy
estate, 50 and he brought an action in the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina against G&P for breach of contract.5 ' Additionally, the plan
trustee brought an action against Advanta and Chase for negligent and wrongful

40. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901,
901 02 (1986).
41. McCullough v. Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc., 373 S.C. 43, 46, 644 S.E.2d 43,
45 (2007).
42. Id. at 46 n.1, 644 S.E.2d at 45 n.1.
43. Id. at 46, 644 S.E.2d at 45.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 43, 46 n.2, 644 S.E.2d at 43, 45 n.2.
51. Id. at 46, 644 S.E.2d at 45.
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impairment of collateral.5 2 In particular, the complaint alleged that Advanta and
Chase had been negligent in the servicing of G&P's mortgage loans, thereby
impairing HomeGold's security interest in G&P's contractual rights to receive
payment under the agreement with Advanta.53
In granting Advanta's and Chase's motions to dismiss, the district court held
that South Carolina did not recognize a claim for negligent impairment of collateral,
and, therefore, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 4 HomeGold's trustee then moved for the district court to reconsider its
ruling and to certify the issue for review by the South Carolina Supreme Court.5
The district court granted the trustee's motion and certified the following question
to the South Carolina Supreme Court: "Does South Carolina law recognize a
secured creditor's right to bring a claim for negligent/wrongful impairment of
collateral where a third party's negligence or other actions caused
the erosion,
' 56
destruction, or reduction in value of the secured party's collateral?
2.

Holding and Court's Reasoning

In answering the certified question, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
"South Carolina law does not recognize a secured creditor's independent claim
against a third party for negligent impairment of collateral."" The court articulated
that in order for a secured creditor to maintain such an independent tort claim,
South Carolina must recognize a legal duty between the third party and the secured
creditor.5 8 The court noted that such a legal duty may arise "by statute, a contractual
59
relationship, status, property interest, or some other special circumstance.
a. No Duty Arising by ContractualRelationship
First, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the contractual relationship
between Advanta and G&P did not give rise to a legal duty owed by Advanta to
HomeGold, G&P's secured creditor.6" In arguing for the existence of a legal duty,
the trustee cited several prior South Carolina cases where the supreme court found
that a contractual relationship between a tortfeasor and one party provided a basis

52. Id.at 46 47, 644 S.E.2d at 45.
53. Id.at47, 644 S.E.2d at45. The complaint also alleged that G&P had itself brought a claim
against Advanta by way of an arbitration proceeding, as the agreement between G&P and Advanta
required arbitration of all claims arising from the contract to be arbitrated. See Complaint at 11,
McCullough v. Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc., No. 8:05-cv-3354-GRA (D.S.C. Dec. 2,
2005), 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 8645, at* 15-16. However, the complaint further alleged
that G&P had withdrawn its claims in the arbitration without prejudice. Id.
54. McCullough, 373 S.C. at 47, 644 S.E.2d at 45.
55. Id.
56. Id.at47, 644 S.E.2d at45-46.
57. Id.at 55, 644 S.E.2d at 50 (emphasis added).
58. Id.at 48, 644 S.E.2d at 46.
59. Id.at47-48, 644 S.E.2d at 46 (citing Madison v. Babcock Ctr.,
Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 136, 638
S.E.2d 650, 656-57 (2006)).
60. Id.at 50, 644 S.E.2d at 47.
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for a legal duty owed by the tortfeasor to an injured third party.6 However, the
court distinguished between the situation in which a secured creditor obtains a
security interest in contractual rights and the situations in which the court has
established a contractual basis for a duty owed to a third party.62 The court noted
that there is a contractual basis for a legal duty owed by a tortfeasor to a third party
only in situations where the third party is an intended beneficiary of the contract or
where the third party is a "foreseeable 'user"' of the tortfeasor's product.63 Because
HomeGold was not an intended beneficiary of the contract between G&P and
Advanta, and because the contract was not executed to provide HomeGold with
collateral, the court found that the contract failed to provide a basis for establishing
an independent duty.64 Furthermore, the court found that HomeGold was not a
foreseeable user of G&P's contractual rights with Advanta.65 Therefore, the court
concluded that there is no contractual basis for recognizing a secured creditor's
claim against a third party for negligent impairment of collateral.66
b.

No Duty Arisingfrom a PropertyInterest

The court also found that there was no property interest in HomeGold's
security interest in G&P's contractual rights to payment that could give rise to a
legal duty owed by Advanta to HomeGold.67 The court did recognize that existing
South Carolina law does allow a mortgagee with a security interest in tangible
personal property "to recover damages from a third party for conversion, injury or
destruction of the collateral."6 8 However, the court refused to analogize a creditor's
security interest in tangible personal property to HomeGold's security interest in
intangible rights to payment.69 The court did not "believe that a security interest in
intangible collateral creates the same basis for a legal duty as a secured party's
interest intangible personal property."" Thus, the court held there was "no property
interest in intangible collateral giving rise to a claim by a secured creditor against
a third party for negligent impairment" of that collateral.7

61. Id. at 48, 644 S.E.2d at 46. Specifically, the trustee directed the court's attention to the
following cases: Dorrellv. South CarolinaDepartment of Transportation,361 S.C. 312, 605 S.E.2d
12 (2004), which held that a subcontractor hired to pave a road owed a legal duty to the motorists using
the road, id at 320, 605 S.E.2d at 16; Barker v. Sauls, 289 S.C. 121, 345 S.E.2d 244 (1986), where the
court found that an insurance agent who entered into a contract to sell workers' compensation coverage
to an employer owed a legal duty to an employee, id at 122, 345 S.E.2d at 244 45; Terlinde v. Neely,
275 S.C. 395,271 S.E.2d 768 (1980), which held that a homebuilder who contracted with a homeowner
owed a legal duty to the subsequent purchasers ofthe home, id at 399,271 S.E.2d at 770; and Edward's
ofByrnes Downs v. Charleston Sheet Metal Co., 253 S.C. 537, 172 S.E.2d 120 (1970), where the court
found that a roofer who contracted with a building owner owed a legal duty to the occupants of adjacent
buildings, id. at 542 43, 172 S.E.2d at 122 23.
62. McCullough, 373 S.C. at 49, 644 S.E.2d at 47.
63. Id. at 49-50, 644 S.E.2d at 47.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 50, 644 S.E.2d at 47.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 52, 644 S.E.2d at 48.
68. Id. at 50, 644 S.E.2d at 47 (citing Wilkes v. S. Ry. Co., 85 S.C. 346, 347 48, 67 S.E. 292, 293
(1910)).
69. Id. at 52, 644 S.E.2d at 48.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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No Duty Arisingfrom Special Circumstances

The court then considered whether there were special circumstances involving
secured creditors and their collateral that should give rise to a legal duty owed to
a third party.72 The court noted that its jurisprudence had recognized a legal duty
owed by a professional to a third party based on the "special relationship" between
the parties." However, the court found "no basis for such a professional duty
running from a third party to a secured creditor. 74
Additionally, the court stated that it had previously recognized a duty between
a tortfeasor and a third party under special circumstances where there were
significant policy reasons that justified finding such a duty.75 However, the court
felt that the bargaining positions of secured creditors and the current nature of
secured transactions did not implicate any legitimate policy concerns-such as
unequal bargaining positions between the parties-that would justify finding a legal
duty between a secured creditor and a third party.76 Accordingly, the court found
no special circumstances regarding secured credit transactions that would provide
a basis for a tort claim by a secured creditor against a third party for negligent
impairment of collateral.77
d. No Duty Arising by Statute
Finally, the court held that Article 9, as adopted by South Carolina,7" does not
establish a statutory duty between a secured creditor and a third party that would
create an independent cause of action for negligent impairment of collateral. 79 The
court rejected the trustee's argument that section 36-9-607(a)(3) of the South

72. See id.
at52-53, 644 S.E.2d at48-49.
73. See id. (citing Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc.,
320 S.C. 49, 53, 463 S.E.2d 85, 87 (1995); Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335,
347, 384 S.E.2d 730, 738 (1989)). In Griffin, the court held that a professional design engineer who
contracted with the County ofCharleston to design a water tank and supervise the project for the county
owed a duty to a different firm, which had contracted with the county to construct the water tank, to
design and to supervise the project with due care. Griffin, 320 S.C. at 56, 463 S.E.2d at 89. South
Carolina courts have also held that other professionals may owe a legal duty to third parties based on
the special relationship between the professional and the third party. See, e.g.,
S.C. Ports Auth. v.Boo:Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 289 S.C. 373, 376 77, 346 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1986) (holding that a consulting
firm contracting with the plaintiff s commercial competitor owed a duty to accurately report objective
factual data about the plaintiff); Lloydv. Walters, 276 S.C. 223, 226, 277 S.E.2d 888, 889 (1981)
(holding an attorney liable to a corporate shareholder when the attorney breached his duty to the
corporation).
74. McCullough, 373 S.C. at 52, 644 S.E.2d at 48.
75. See id.
at 53, 644 S.E.2d at 49 (citing Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335,
347, 384 S.E.2d 730, 738 (1989)). In Kennedy, the court found that a homebuilder owed a legal duty
to prevent economic harm to future homebuyers. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 347, 384 S.E.2d at 738. The
Kennedy court noted that since the post-World War II housing boom, modern homebuyers no longer
supervised construction and no longer enjoyed equal bargaining positions, a situation that called for
increased protection of the innocent future homebuyer. Id.at 343-44, 384 S.E.2d at 735-36 (citations
omitted).
76. McCullough, 373 S.C. at 53, 644 S.E.2d at 49.
77. Id.
78. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-101 to -709 (2003 & Supp. 2006).
79. McCullough, 373 S.C. at 55, 644 S.E.2d at 50.
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Carolina Code8" provides a secured creditor with the right to such a cause of
action.8 In fact, the court held that section 36-9-607(e)82 specifically refutes the
trustee's theory that a statutory duty exists between a secured creditor and a third
party.83 Additionally, the court noted that Article 9, as adopted by South Carolina,
provides ample means for a secured creditor to protect its security interest from a
reduction in value due to a third party's actions, without establishing a legal duty
between a secured creditor and a third party.84 Therefore, the court found no
statutory basis for recognizing a cause of action between such parties for
impairment of collateral. 5 Finding no duty arising by contract, personal property
interest, special circumstance, or statute, the South Carolina Supreme Court
accordingly held that "South Carolina law does not recognize a secured creditor's
independent claim against a third party for negligent impairment of collateral."86
Il1.

CRITIQUE OF MCCULLOUGH

The South Carolina Court of Appeals has stated that "a duty is not sacrosanct
in itself but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."" A
secured party that has a security interest impaired by a third party should be a
plaintiff "entitled to protection.""8 After all, a secured party's security interest is a
bargained-for form of protection. 9 If a wrongdoer interferes with that protection,
the law should provide a remedy in the form of a right of action against that
wrongdoer. However, under South Carolina law, a legal duty to prevent harm to
another must arise as a result of a contractual relationship, property interest, special
circumstance, or statutory scheme. 90 The South Carolina Supreme Court could have
recognized a secured creditor's right to bring an action against a third party for
impairing collateral based on the property interest a secured creditor holds.

80. Section 36-9-607(a)(3) provides as follows:
[A]fter [a debtor's] default, a secured party .. may enforce the obligations of an
account debtor or other person obligated on collateral and exercise the rights of
the debtor with respect to the obligation of the account debtor or other person
obligated on collateral to make payment or otherwise render performance to the
debtor, and with respect to any property that secures the obligations of the account
debtor or other person obligated on the collateral.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-607(a)(3) (2003).
81. McCullough, 373 S.C. at 53-54, 644 S.E.2d at 49.
82. Section 36-9-607(e) provides that section 36-9-607 "does not determine whether an account
debtor, bank, or other person obligated on collateral owes a duty to a secured party." S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-9-607(e).
83. McCullough, 373 S.C. at 54, 644 S.E.2d at 49.
84. Id.at 55, 644 S.E.2d at 50.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Araujo v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 291 S.C. 54, 57-58, 351 S.E.2d 908, 910 (Ct. App. 1986).
88. Idat 58, 351 S.E.2d at 910.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 20 28 (discussing that lenders obtain security interests
in collateral to protect themselves from the debtor's default).
90. See Jensen v. Anderson County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 304 S.C. 195, 199, 403 S.E.2d 615, 617
(1991).
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A Security Interest as a Sufficient Property Interest for Recognizing a
Secured Creditor's Claim Against a Third Party

In determining that there was no property interest that could provide a basis for
establishing a legal duty between a secured creditor and a third party where the
security interest was in contractual rights to payment, the McCullough court
distinguished between tangible and intangible collateral.9 South Carolina law has
long recognized the right of a secured creditor to maintain an action against a third
party for "conversion, injury, or destruction" of the secured creditor's collateral in
tangible personal property. 92 Indeed, according to South Carolina's own legal
encyclopedia, "[p]rovided there has been an impairment of the security, the
mortgagee is allowed to maintain an action to recover damages from anyone who
damages the mortgaged property. ' The McCullough court concedes this right. 94
If a secured creditor can maintain an independent action against a third party for
damage to a security interest in tangible personal property, why not allow a secured
creditor to maintain the same action against a third party for damage to a security
interest in intangible collateral? After all, a secured party is unlikely to be
concerned with being able to actually use the collateral but rather is more likely
concerned with collecting on the value of the collateral in the event of default.
Thus, the court did not have to distinguish between a security interest in tangible
property and a security interest in intangible property.
One commentator, discussing the McCullough court's distinction between
tangible and intangible collateral, noted the following:
I do not understand the court's distinction between tortious
impairment of tangible and intangible collateral. What's the
difference? If the servicing agency was aware that the secured
creditor was relying on the stream of payments and nevertheless
acted negligently in handling the mortgage lender's affairs, why
should it matter whether the collateral was tangible or not? 9
Nonetheless, the South Carolina Supreme Court refused to analogize a secured
creditor's interest in intangible rights to payment with a mortgagee's security
interest in tangible personal property. 96
Courts in other jurisdictions have found no difference between tangible
collateral and intangible collateral in recognizing the cause of action at issue in
McCullough. For instance, in Baldwin v. Marina City Props., Inc.,97 a California
appellate court held that a secured creditor had "an accrued cause of action against

91. McCullough, 373 S.C. at 52, 644 S.E.2d at 48.
92. See Wilkes v. S. Ry. Co., 85 S.C. 346, 347-48, 67 S.E. 292,293 (1910) (citing Wylie v. Ohio
River & Charleston R.R., 48 S.C. 405, 407, 26 S.E. 676, 676 (1897)).
93. 27 S.C. JURIS. Mortgages § 70 (1996) (emphasis added).
94. See McCullough, 373 S.C. at 50, 644 S.E.2d at 47 (citing Wilkes, 85 S.C. at 347-48, 67 S.E.
at293).
95. Dan Schechter, Loan ServicingAgency Is Not Liable to Mortgage Lender's Secured Creditor
for Tortious Inpairmentof Intangible Collateral, COM. FIN. NEWSL. (Westlaw), May 7, 2007, at 36,
available at 2007 COMMFINNL 36.
96. McCullough, 373 S.C. at 52, 644 S.E.2d at 48.
97. 145 Cal. Rptr. 406 (Ct. App. 1978).
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[a third party] for an alleged impairment of the value of the [secured creditor's]
collateral" where the collateral was an interest in a limited partnership.98 In RFC
CapitalCorp. v. EarthLink,Inc., an Ohio court concluded that a secured creditor
could assert a claim against a third party for impairment of its security interest in
an internet service provider's customer base. 100 Furthermore, a New York district
court in Pioneer CommercialFunding Corp. v. UnitedAirlines, Inc. 101 refused to
dismiss a claim brought by a group of creditors against a third party for impairment
of the group's security interests in its debtor's accounts receivable. °2 Finally, in
Bank of India v. Weg & Myers, P.C.,13 a New York court not only recognized a
bank's claim against a law firm for impairment of the bank's security interest in its
right to receive insurance proceeds, but the court also granted the bank's motion for
summary judgment on the same claim.'0 4 The above cases question whether any
otherjurisdiction supports the South Carolina Supreme Court's distinction between
tangible collateral and intangible collateral for purposes of recognizing a secured
party's right to maintain an action against a third party for impairing the secured
party's collateral.
9 9

1. Basisfor the McCullough Decision: Universal C.1.T. Credit Corp. v.
Trapp
The McCullough court based its distinction between tangible and intangible
collateral on its earlier decision in Universal C.I.T.Credit Corp. v. Trappl o' and a
similar line of cases. 6 In Universal, the mortgagor of an automobile brought an
action arising out of an automobile collision against another driver for damages to

98. Id. at 414. In Baldwin, the plaintiffs sold their partnership interests in Marina City Properties,
the third party in this case, to the debtor. Id. at 409. The debtor executed certain promissory notes
payable to the plaintiffs, while the plaintiffs retained a security interest in the partnership interests that
were being sold. Id. The general partner of Marina City Properties subsequently made a capital call to
the limited partners that went unanswered. Id.at 410. Thereafter, Marina City Properties contributed
funds to the limited partnership, and the Certificate of Limited Partnership was amended to reflect this
contribution. Id.As a result of this amendment, each partnership interest in Marina City Properties was
proportionately reduced in value. Id.The plaintiffs claimed that the capital call contributions were
unnecessary and the result of .'self-dealing."' Id. The court found that the plaintiffs had an accrued
cause of action against the third party, Marina City Properties, for impairing the value of the plaintiffs'
collateral by its wrongful acts. Id. at 414.
99. No. 03AP-735, 2004 WL 2980402 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2004).
100. Id. at * 18 ("[A] secured party may... assert a claim for the impairment of a security interest
if the facts support it.").
101. 122 B.R. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
102. Id. at 885 87. The Pioneer court noted that "[w]hile it is true that many of the cases dealing
with impairment of security interests involve real property mortgages,... there is no reason why other
secured interests cannot be protected in a similar fashion." Id.at886 (citation omitted).
103. 691 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
104. Id.at 445 (stating that the record "warrants summary judgment to the Bank on the claims that
Weg & Myers impaired the Bank's security interest").
105. 232 S.C. 297, 101 S.E.2d 829 (1958).
106. McCullough v. Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc., 373 S.C. 43, 51 52, 644 S.E.2d
43, 48 (2007) (citing Mercer v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 189 S.E. 762, 763 (N.C. 1937); Fidelity Fin.
Servs. v. Blaser, 889 P.2d 268, 272 (Okla. 1994); Johnson v. Wright, 280 S.C. 535, 538-39 313 S.E.2d
343, 346 (Ct.App. 1984); Int'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Valdez, 709 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985).
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the mortgaged vehicle. °7 While that action was pending, the mortgagee of the
damaged automobile notified the at-fault driver of its security interest in the
automobile and requested that the at-fault driver respect that interest by including
the mortgagee as a payee on any settlement funds paid on the claim.'0 8 However,
the third party ignored the mortgagee's request and settled directly with the
mortgagor. °9 The mortgagee, in turn, brought suit against the at-fault driver and his
insurer for "willfully and maliciously" interfering with its right to recover the
settlement payments for damage to the collateral." 0 The court affirmed the lower
court's judgment and held that the third party was under no legal duty to ensure that
the mortgagee received its interest in the settlement funds."'
The McCullough court apparently viewed the Universal court's refusal to
recognize the claim brought by the mortgagee against the third party tortfeasor as
disapproving of claims against third parties for impairment of intangible rights." 2
However, the court in Universalfocused more on the mortgagee's other available
options to protect its interest than on the intangible nature of the interest. The
Universal court noted that "the plaintiff. . . could have protected its rights by
intervening in the action by its mortgagor against the tortfeasor."" 3 Additionally,
the Universal court noted that "[w]hen the mortgagor has received payment for the
damages, . . . [the] mortgagee . . . may enforce [payment] by appropriate
proceedings" because the funds are held in trust for the mortgagee.' 14Because the
mortgagee in Universal could have either intervened in the action brought by his
mortgagor or proceeded directly against his mortgagor to recover the portion of the
settlement funds held in trust, there were ample means by which the mortgagee
could have protected its interest. Because of these alternative remedies, there was
no reason for the court to create a legal duty owed by a third party to a secured
creditor to ensure protection of the mortgagee's rights. The intangible nature of the
mortgagee's rights to payment seems to be of no consequence in the Universal
court's analysis. Thus, the South Carolina Supreme Court did not have to read
Universal as prioritizing tangible property rights over intangible property rights.
2.

Universal No Longer Applicable

Notably, Universal was decided before the adoption of Article 9 and, more
specifically, before South Carolina adopted current section 36-9-102(a)(64)'s
expanded definition of proceeds. To fully understand the significance of this
adoption requires an overview of the history and development of section 36-9102(a)(64).

107. 232 S.C. at 298, 101 S.E.2d at 830.
108. Id. at 298-99, 101 S.E.2d at 830.
109. Id.at 299, 101 S.E.2d at 830.
110. Id.at 298, 101 S.E.2d at 830.
111. Id. at 301-03, 101 S.E.2d at 831-33.
112. See McCullough v. Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc., 373 S.C. 43, 51-52, 644
S.E.2d 43, 48 (2007) (discussing Universal and finding, based on the decision in that case, that a
security interest in intangible rights does not create the sane basis for recognizing a legal duty as a
security interest in tangible rights does).
113. 232 S.C. at300, 101 S.E.2d at 831.
114. Id.(quoting Harris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 130 S.E. 319, 323 (N.C. 1925)).
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In 200 1, the South Carolina General Assembly adopted the revised version of
Article 9 in sections 36-9-101 to -709 of the South Carolina Code," 5 superseding
the former version of Article 9." 16 Section 36-9-315 of the South Carolina Code
provides that "a security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of
collateral.""' 7 Section 36-9-102(a)(64) defines proceeds to include any "rights
arising out of collateral,""' 8 as well as any "claims arising out of the loss,
nonconformity, or interference with the use of, defects or infringement of rights in,
or damage to, the collateral." ' 9 Thus, the plain language of revised Article 9 clearly
suggests that proceeds encompasses a secured party's security interest not only in
the debtor's right to settlement funds payable for damage to the collateral but also
in the debtor's tort claim for damage to the collateral.
Revised Article 9 expanded the definition of proceeds beyond its definition
under former Article 9.12' The previous version of section 36-9-306, effective in
South Carolina in 1989,1l z defined proceeds simply as anything "received upon the
' 22
sale, exchange, collection, or other disposition of collateral or proceeds."'
Additionally, the prior definition specifically stated that any "[i]nsurance payable
by reason of loss or damage to the collateral" constituted proceeds, and thus, 123a
secured creditor had a security interest in such casualty insurance payments.
However, under the previous definition ofproceeds in section 9-306 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), courts expressed uncertainty as to whether a secured
creditor had a security interest in settlement funds or damage awards received by
the debtor in a tort action against a third party for damage to the collateral. 124 This
uncertainty may seem perplexing because tort settlements and casualty insurance
payments are conceptually alike, in that "each arise on account of an event that
damages the collateral's economic value.', 125 In McGonigle v. Combs, 1 26 decided
under the prior version of section 9-306, the court held that settlement funds
received by the debtor for a securities fraud claim constituted proceeds of the
12
securities, giving the secured creditor a security interest in the settlement funds.
Section 36-9-102(a)(64) of the South Carolina Code appears to codify the Ninth

115. Uniform Commercial Code, 2001 S.C. Acts 1223 (codified at S.C. CODEANN. §§ 36-9-101
to -709 (2003 & Supp. 2006)).
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-101 cmt. 1 (2003).
117. Id. § 36-9-315(a)(2); see also id. § 36-9-315 cmt. 3 ("[A] security interest attaches to any
identifiable 'proceeds,' as defined in Section 9-102.").
118. Id. § 36-9-102(a)(64)(C).
119. Id. § 36-9-102(a)(64)(D).
120. Id. § 36-9-102 cmt. 13 ("The revised definition of'proceeds' expands the definition beyond
that contained in former Section 9-306 and resolves ambiguities in the former Section.").
121. Uniform Commercial Code, 1989 S.C. Acts 4530 (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. 36-9101 to -709 (2003 & Supp. 2006)).
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-306(1) (Supp. 1989).
123. Id.; see also id. cmt. I ("[This section] makes clear that insurance proceeds from casualty
loss of collateral are proceeds within the meaning of [section 36-9-306].").
124. Compare Sicherman v. Falkenberg (In re Falkenberg), 136 B.R. 481, 485 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1992) (stating that settlement proceeds "came within [section] 9-306's definition of 'proceeds"'), with
Jarboe v. First Nat'l Bank of Pryor (In re Boyd), 658 P.2d 470, 474 (Okla. 1983) ("[M]onies recovered
by debtor from a third party as a result of debtor's claim in tort against the third party are not 'proceeds'
under [section] 9-306(1) .... ").
125. Freyermuth, supra note 3, at 672.
126. 968 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1992).
127. Id. at 828.
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Circuit's decision in its expanded definition ofproceeds.128 Thus, under section 369-102(a)(64), a secured party now has a security interest in any settlement funds
payable to the debtor as a result of a claim arising from damage to the secured
party's collateral.
Prior to the adoption of section 36-9-102(a)(64) and its expansion of the
definition of proceeds, a mortgagee in South Carolina did not possess a security
interest in settlement funds payable to the debtor from a tort claim arising from
damage to the collateral. As such, the mortgagee in Universal,decided before the
adoption of Article 9, only had a security interest in the automobile itself and not
129
in the settlement funds to be paid by the tortfeasor for damaging the automobile.
Therefore, the third party could not have impaired any security interest of the
mortgagee when it made settlement payments to the mortgagor." 0 If the same facts
in Universalarose today, however, the mortgagee would have a security interest in
the settlement funds payable on the mortgagor's tort claim as such funds now
constitute "proceeds" of collateral.' 3 ' Because the mortgagee in Universal was
asserting that the defendants interfered with its rights in the settlement funds'32 and
because today the settlement funds would be subject to a security interest, the
following question arises: is a security interest a sufficient property interest to allow
the secured party to bring an action, in its own right, against a third party for
impairing the property subject to a security interest?
One commentator has aptly answered this question, noting that a secured
creditor's bundle of rights associated with its security interest "should be significant
enough to constitute the secured lender a real party in interest with standing to bring
an action against a person who damages the collateral ... ."' " Not the least of these
rights is the secured party's right to take actual possession of the collateral upon
default by the debtor. 3 4 However, many of the rights in the bundle can only be
determined by referencing the particular security agreement entered into between
the parties.' 5 The secured party's bundle of rights, whether stated in the security
agreement or not, will be worth significantly less in the open market "to a potential
assignee of those rights" if the collateral is damaged.'36 Furthermore, if the debtor
ultimately defaults, the secured party's rights with respect to the collateral will be
worth less to the secured creditor in terms of the value of the collateral upon
foreclosure.' 37 Because a security arrangement provides a secured party with certain
rights regarding the property in which it holds a security interest, those rights
should be afforded full protection. As discussed, those rights incident to the security
interest are intimately tied to the economic value of the collateral. By recognizing
a secured party's right to maintain its own independent claim against a third party

128. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-102(a)(64)(D) (2003) (definingproceedsas "claims arising out
of... damage to ...the collateral").
129. Universal C.I.T.Credit Corp. v. Trapp, 232 S.C. 297, 301, 101 S.E.2d 829, 831-32 (1958).
130. Id.
131. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-102(a)(64).
132. Universal, 232 S.C. at300-01, 101 S.E.2d at831.
133. Weinberg, supranote 4, at448.
134. Id.at 447.
135. Id. For instance, the agreement may provide a secured party with the "right to 'police' or
otherwise assert dominion over the collateral" prior to default. Id.
136. ld. at 448.
137. Id.
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tortfeasor who impairs the economic value of collateral, the bundle of rights
associated with the security interest in the collateral remains fully protected. Thus,
a security interest in any form of collateral, whether tangible or intangible, should
provide a sufficient basis for a secured creditor's right to maintain an independent
action against a third party tortfeasor for impairment of collateral.' 38 If it had
adopted this view, the McCullough court could have found that HomeGold's
security interest in G&P's contractual rights to receive payment from Advanta
provided a sufficient property interest. Such an interest would warrant recognition
of the trustee's claim for negligent impairment of collateral.
B. A Closer Look at Article 9 's Expanded Definition of Proceeds
Section 36-9-102(a)(64) not only adopts the Ninth Circuit's MeGonigle
decision, but it also expands on that decision by treating the tort claim itself, not
just the settlement funds or damages recovered, as proceeds of collateral.' 39 Under
the definition of proceeds in former section 9-306 of the UCC, courts had held the
term proceeds did not include the debtor's right of action against a third party for
4
damage to collateral. 40 For example, in Bank of New York v. Margiotta,1
1 a New
York court addressed "whether 'identifiableproceeds' may be stretched to include
a cause of action. 142 Under the former definition ofproceeds, the New York court
concluded that it could not; therefore, the secured creditor could not maintain an
action against a third party for damaging the creditor's collateral. 43 At least one
commentator has expressed disagreement, noting that "[a] tort claim for negligent
damage to collateral arises on account of an event that damaged the collateral's
economic value. As a result, a tort claim falls squarely within the proper scope of
the term 'proceeds'.....
Perhaps, because of this disagreement, the drafters of the revised version of
Article 9 sought to address more specifically "the proper scope of the term

138. By recognizing a secured party's independent claim against a third party, concerns may arise
about holding the third party liable twice for a single wrong, as the debtor presumably has a claim in
its own right. However, these concerns could easily be alleviated by allowing the secured party to sue
for the entire value of the collateral damaged. Id. A constructive trust could then be imposed on any
recovery from a judgment or settlement in excess of the debt secured. See id Any judgment or
settlement resulting from the secured party's claim would preclude the tortfeasor from incurring further
liability on a subsequent claim brought by the debtor. Id.Conversely, if the debtor is the first party to
bring a suit against the tortfeasor, then any judgment or settlement on that claim would bar the secured
party from later bringing a claim. Under this scenario, a constructive trust in favor of the secured party
could be imposed equal to the value of the collateral.
This is surely not the only method to prevent courts from imposing double liability on the third
party tortfeasor. In applying principles of equity, courts are more than capable of preventing such
injustice while simultaneously providing adequate protection to a secured party whose collateral has
been impaired.
139. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-102(a)(64)(D) (2003).
140. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Snack, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 145, 146-47 (Ct.Com. Pl.
Allegheny County
1964) ("Absent a sale, exchange or other disposition, there can be no proceeds such as [former Section
9-306] contemplates.").
141. 416 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1979).
142. Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. Freyermuth, supra note 3, at 674.
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'proceeds.""4 5 In doing so, the drafters composed, 146 and the South Carolina
legislature ultimately adopted, 147 the language used in the expanded definition of
the term proceeds in section 36-9-102(a)(64) of the South Carolina Code. 14 ' The
language of subsection (a)(64)(D) provides that proceeds of collateral include any
claims that arise from damage or impairment of the secured party's collateral. 49 In
fact, in 2005, a bankruptcy court declared that under the expanded definition of
proceeds, "[i]t is clear that rights arising from loss or damage to collateral are
'proceeds ....
Seemingly, a tort claim against a third party for negligently
impairing the secured party's collateral would be included in those rights.
Therefore, under subsection (a)(64),'15 in coordination with section 36-9315(a)(2), 152 a secured party now has a security interest in its debtor's tort claim
against a third party for damaging collateral. Such an interest, in spite of the court's
ruling in McCullough, may provide a secured creditor with some form of protection
against a third party that impairs the creditor's collateral.
C. Optionsfor ProtectionAfter McCullough
McCullough, at first glance, may appear to leave secured creditors whose
collateral has been damaged or impaired by a third party without any relief.
However, the applicability of the court's opinion in McCullough is limited; the
opinion only bars a secured creditor from bringing a claim against a third party that
is based on an independent tort duty between the third party and the secured
creditor. 151 Secured creditors under the South Carolina Code now have a
security interest in a debtor's tort claim against a third party for damaging
collateral. 54 Such a security interest may provide relief to a secured creditor when
a third party has tortiously impaired the collateral. This relief may be available
notwithstanding the McCullough court's refusal to recognize a secured creditor's
independent right to bring a tort claim against a third party.
Section 36-9-607(a)(3) of the South Carolina Code offers some measure of
relief to the secured party. This section provides that after default, a secured party
may exercise the rights of the debtor with respect to a third party's obligations on
the collateral.15' The official comment to section 36-9-607 further provides that

145. Id. at 692.
146. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (2007).
147. Uniform Commercial Code, 2001 S.C. Acts 1248 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9102(a)(64) (2003)).
148. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-102(a)(64).
149. Id.§ 36-9-102(a)(64)(D).
150. Wiersma v. Kruse (In re Wiersma), 324 B.R. 92, 108 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005), rev'd on other
grounds, 483 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2007).
151. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-102(a)(64).
152. Id. § 36-9-315(a)(2) ("[A] security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of
collateral.").
153. See McCullough v. Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc., 373 S.C. 43, 55, 644 S.E.2d
43, 50 (2007). ("[W]e answer that South Carolina law does not recognize a secured creditor's
independent claim against a third party for negligent impairment of collateral.").
154. See supra text accompanying notes 115 19, 129 31.
155. S.C. CODEANN. § 36-9-607(a)(3). Specifically, section 36-9-607(a)(3) provides as follows:
[A]fter default, a secured party ... may enforce the obligations of an account
debtor or other person obligated on collateral and exercise the rights of the debtor
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"[t]he rights of a secured party under [section 36-9-607(a)] include the right to
enforce claims that the debtor may enjoy against others."' 6 Because section 36-9102(a)(64)(D), in conjunction with section 36-9-315(a)(2), provides a secured party
with a security interest in the debtor's claims against a third party for damaging
collateral, 157 section 36-9-607 grants the secured party the right to enforce the
debtor's claim against the third party if the debtor defaults on the loan. Thus, upon
the debtor's default, Article 9 permits subrogation to the secured creditor of the
debtor's accrued claim against a third party for impairing the value of the collateral.
The McCullough court, in fact, agreed with this point, acknowledging that "th[e]
language [of section 36-9-607(a)(3)] appears to permit subrogation of the debtor's
right to the secured party.' ' 158 Therefore, if the debtor has the right to bring an action
against a third party for impairing or damaging the collateral, then upon default,
that claim is subrogated to the secured party, allowing the secured creditor to bring
the claim against the third party in place of the debtor. Arguably, such a claim did
not arise from an independent duty owed by the third party to the secured creditor,
as McCullough prohibits.159 Rather, the claim arises from the duty owed by the third
party to the debtor.
Applying this reasoning to the facts in McCullough, the debtor, G&P, had an
accrued cause of action arising from Advanta's improper servicing of the G&P
loans, as Advanta's conduct impaired Advanta's ability to make its contractual
payments to G&P."6 ° Because HomeGold had a security interest in G&P's rights to
receive payment from Advanta, G&P's claim against Advanta attached as proceeds,
thereby giving HomeGold a security interest in G&P's claim. Under the
subrogation theory permitted by section 36-9-607, HomeGold as the secured party
would have been able to enforce its debtor's claim against Advanta, as G&P was
delinquent on its loan from HomeGold. Perhaps the fatal flaw in the trustee's
complaint was pleading its claim against Advanta as "negligent" impairment of
collateral, 16 implying that the action arose from a legal duty owed by Advanta to
HomeGold. 6 2 But when making a subrogation claim, "[o]rdinarily, one seeking
subrogation must plead it and set forth the facts from which the right of subrogation
arises."'' 63 Thus, section 36-9-607 will often provide a mechanism for protecting

with respect to the obligation of the account debtor or other person obligated on
collateral to make payment or otherwise render performance to the debtor, and
with respect to any property that secures the obligations of the account debtor or
other person obligated on the collateral.
Id.
156. Id. cmt. 3.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 145 52.
158. McCullough, 373 S.C. at 53 54, 644 S.E.2d at 49.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 6-12.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 41-53. As stated earlier, G&P did in fact bring a claim
against Advanta through an arbitration proceeding that was purportedly withdrawn without prejudice.
See supra note 53.
161. See supra text accompanying note 52.
162. Notably, the trustee may have been seeking to avoid the mandatory arbitration provision
contained in the agreement between G&P and Advanta by attempting to bring an independent claim.
Had the trustee asserted G&P's rights by bringing a subrogation claim, HomeGold would have been
bound by the arbitration provision.
163. Horton v. Ford Life Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 88,92 (Neb. 1994) (citing Cagle, Inc. v. Sammons,
254 N.W.2d 398, 403 04 (Neb. 1977)).
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secured creditors from impairment of their collateral by third parties by allowing
them to make a subrogation claim. However, as noted above, properly pleading the
circumstances from which the right to subrogation arises is essential to avoid
dismissal of the complaint.
While section 36-9-607 only provides relief to the secured party once the
debtor is in default, the secured party may wish to seek relief from its impaired
security interest before the debtor becomes delinquent. This can be accomplished
by an assignment of the debtor's cause of action against the third party to the
secured party.' 64 Through an assignment, the secured party (the assignee) would be
entitled to "stand in the shoes" of the debtor (assignor) and bring a claim against the
third party whose conduct impaired the collateral. As to the terms of the
assignment, the debtor and the secured party "should agree as to how any proceeds
from such a claim will be applied to extinguish the debtor's obligation to the
lender .... 1 However, one potential drawback of an assignment is that the
secured party takes the claim subject to any defenses which could have been
established against the debtor. 166 Nonetheless, secured parties have a few options
with which to protect themselves from third parties that impair the value of their
collateral. Thus, the availability of both subrogation and assignment provides the
best available protection to those secured parties whose collateral has been
impaired.
IV. CONCLUSION

For every security interest granted in collateral, a bundle of rights arises that
gives a secured creditor a significant interest in that property; these rights should
be fully protected, regardless of whether the collateral is tangible or intangible
property. The set of rights is intimately connected with the economic value of the
property used as collateral. Thus, courts, in protecting a secured party's bundle of
rights, should provide a secured creditor with an independent remedy when the
economic value of the secured party's collateral has been impaired by a third
party's wrongdoing. Unfortunately, the South Carolina Supreme Court in
McCullough did not agree.' 67 However, a secured party may nevertheless be able
to protect itself by bringing the debtor's claim against the third party as a
subrogation claim once the debtor defaults. Additionally, a secured party may be
able to protect itself before the debtor defaults by taking an assignment of the
debtor's claim against the third party.
In conclusion, allowing a secured party to maintain an action, in its own right,
against the wrongful actions of a third party would provide secured parties with
more certain protection from events that impair the value of their collateral. The

164. See Amanda K. Esquibel, An Article 9 PrimerRegarding UninsuredCollateralDestroyed
by a Tortfeasor,46 U. KAN. L. REv. 211, 237 38 (1998). Professor Esquibel's article provides a short
discussion of various issues and concerns that may arise for both the secured party and the debtor
regarding the assignment of the debtor's claim against a third party. Id.at 238-39.
165. Id.at 238.
166. See Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 308 S.C. 410, 413, 418 S.E.2d 337, 338 (Ct.
App. 1992) (citation omitted). Indeed, HomeGold's trustee likely elected not to pursue an assignment
of G&P's claim against Advanta because that claim was subject to arbitration. See supra note 162.
167. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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less certainty there is in the protection of secured parties' rights, the higher the
interest rates will be when secured lenders offer loans to consumers.' 68 Because of
the uncertainty that has resulted from the decision in McCullough, consumers may
be faced with higher interest rates. The stated purpose of former Article 9 was to
provide a structure in which "secured financing transactions can go forward with
less cost and with greater certainty."' 6 9 Following the McCullough decision, one
cannot help but ponder whether secured transactions will be able to proceed with
less cost and greater certainty in South Carolina.
R. Davis Rice

168. See Esquibel, supra note 164, at 220.
169. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-101 cmt. (Supp. 1989), superseded by Uniform Commercial
Code, 2001 S.C. Acts 1223 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §36-9-101 cmt. 1 (2003)).
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